I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological (...) view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as interpretações "tradicional" e "resoluta" não livraram o "Tractatus" da aparente autoderrota paradoxal. Argumento que essas leituras apresentam apenas uma nova roupagem ao paradoxo. A leitura "tradicional" de Hacker acaba atribuindo uma conspiração metafísica ao "Tractatus", o que é incompatível com os objetivos do livro. A leitura "resoluta" de Diamond e Conant atribui a Wittgenstein uma conspiração autoral, o que contradiz suas opiniões sobre autoria e método. Com base nas dificuldades encontradas em (...) ambos os lados do debate atual, concluo este artigo propondo vários requisitos que a correta interpretação do "Tractatus" deve preencher. (shrink)

Argumento que precisamos mudar de perspectiva na elucidação da referência a Mauthner no Tractatus. A pergunta a ser feita não é “Quais são as semelhanças ou diferenças entre os projetos de Mauthner e do Tractatus?”, mas “Por que Wittgenstein se deu ao trabalho de negar que sua Sprachkritik poderia ter alguma relação com Mauthner?”. A significatividade da negação em “não no sentido de Mauthner” (TLP 4.0031) não se encontra em um problema comum para o qual Mauthner e Wittgenstein teriam suas (...) respostas, como pensavam Janik e Toulmin, mas no fato da Sprachkritik de Mauthner figurar, dentro do Círculo Kraus, como expressão da superficialidade moral da Europa no início do século XX.AbstractThe paper argues that we need to change our perspective to elucidate the reference to Mauthner in the Tractatus. The question is not “What are the similarities or major differences between Mauthner’s views and the Tractatus?” but “Why did Wittgenstein bother to deny that his Sprachkritik could have anything to do with Mauthner’s?” The significance of the negation in “not in Mauthner’s sense” (TLP 4.0031) is not found in a common problem to which Mauthner and Wittgenstein had different answers, as Janik and Toulmin thought, but in the fact that Mauthner’s Sprachkritik is seen within the Kraus Circle as an expression of the moral superficiality of European culture at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

This Element presents a concise and accessible view of the central arguments of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Starting from the difficulties found in historical and current debates, drawing on the background of Russell's philosophy, and grounded in the ladder structure expressed in the numbering system of the book, this Element presents the central arguments of the Tractatus in three lines of thought. The first concerns the role of the so-called 'ontology' and its relationship to the method of the Tractatus and its (...) logical symbolism, which displays the formal essence of language and world. The second deals with the symbolic unity of language and its role in the 'ladder structure' and explains how and why the book is not self-defeating. The third elucidates Wittgenstein's claim to have solved in essentials all philosophical problems, whose very formulation, he says, rests on misunderstandings. (shrink)